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NOTE
ALVAREZ V. LOPEZ: THE NINTH CIRCUIT OVEREXTENDS
CONGRESS'S INTENDED USE OF PLENARY POWERS
WITH ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE ICRA JURY
PROVISION
Teddy Webb*
I. Introduction
While Congress has plenary powers to impose sovereignty restricting
statutes on tribes, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have a duty to
interpret those statutes with the goal of respecting tribal sovereignty as
much as possible. The Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) is a sovereigntyrestricting statute, and throughout interpreting the nuances of the ICRA, the
courts confront many crossroads at which they must restrain themselves
from imposing federal standards that too heavily tread on tribal sovereignty.
The judicial duty is challenging due to the intrinsic concerns for individual
rights shared by federal judges, which sometimes conflict with the
community-oriented foundations of tribal jurisprudence. It is at these
instances of conflict, however, that federal judges must show restraint when
interpreting the ICRA against tribal courts in order to respect tribal
sovereignty over their own personal beliefs.
In Alvarez v. Lopez,1 the Ninth Circuit took a biased approach when
answering the question of whether criminal defendant Alvarez’s rights were
violated when the Gila Indian River Community (“the Community”) tribal
court informed him of his right to a jury trial, but did not inform him that he
was required to request a jury in order to receive one.2 As is evident by the
venomous criticisms laid out in the majority opinion, the Ninth Circuit
judges struggled to separate their views of federal jurisprudence from
Congress’s goal of respecting tribal sovereignty when the tribal actions
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. 835 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. Aug. 2016). This case was originally filed on August 30, 2016,
as Alvarez v. Tracy. However, Ron Lopez succeeded Randy Tracy as Chief Administrator
for the Gila River Indian Department of Rehabilitation and Supervision. The court
substituted Lopez for Tracy pursuant to Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
2. Part I of the case, exhaustion, is not discussed in this Note. This Note will focus on
Part II of the case, habeas relief.
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conflicted with federal procedural norms. The Ninth Circuit had a duty to
tread lightly when imposing the ICRA upon the Community tribal court,
but it failed to meet this duty by reading into the ICRA a mandate to inform
the defendant of the requirement to request a jury; a requirement that is not
supported by the canons of federal Indian law nor by the text and context of
the ICRA.
The delineation of power between federal and tribal governments and the
interpretation of congressional plenary power over tribes has developed
through cases such as Talton v. Mayes,3 United States v. Wheeler,4 Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,5 and United States v. Lara.6 As discussed in
detail below, history and precedent requires federal courts to take a
deferential approach when reviewing tribal court cases in order to promote
and secure tribal sovereignty. Over a century of federal precedent calls for
restraint from reading mandates out of congressional silence, which the
majority did not follow when it found an implicit mandate to inform. The
ICRA provision at issue states that “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers
of self-government shall . . . deny to any person accused of an offense
punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury,”7
clearly lacking an explicit mandate to inform and imposing instead a
requirement to not deny requested jury trials.
Along with the lack of textual and contextual support for the mandate to
inform, the Randall balancing test employed by the majority is
inappropriate and outdated. The appropriate test for review is provided in
Martinez.8 Martinez calls for construing against the tribe only in the face of
arbitrary and unjust tribal action.9 This is a highly deferential standard;
years of precedent have held that standards of tribal courts are not replicas
of federal standards, and in some cases the standards vary greatly.
The opinion offers the opportunity to discuss the appropriate judicial
application of congressional plenary powers and the appropriate method of
construing the ICRA’s right to jury provision. Due to the lack of conformity
with the congressional goal of respecting tribal sovereignty when
interpreting congressional plenary powers and the use of an inappropriate

3. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
4. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
5. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
6. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) (2012) (emphasis added).
8. 436 U.S. 49.
9. Id. at 61.
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balancing test, the majority erred in its decision against the Community
tribal court.
II. Law Before the Case
A. Plenary Powers
1. Constitutional Grant of Congressional Plenary Powers
Congress, by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution,
holds plenary powers that enable it to either impose or relax restrictions on
tribal sovereignty.10 The constitutional provisions from which Congress’s
plenary powers originate are the Indian Commerce Clause11 and the Treaty
Clause.12 Although treaty-making power is granted to the President, it is
normally extended to authorize Congress to “deal with ‘matters.’”13
Congressional plenary powers are also supported by Congress’s historical
role in setting Indian policy.14 United States v. Lara reveals important
issues that are still hotly debated today, such as whether there is truly a
broad constitutional grant of congressional plenary powers and the
compatibility of the doctrines of inherent tribal sovereignty and federal
plenary powers.15 The relationship between the jurisdictional powers of the
federal government and the tribes, and the application of congressional
plenary powers, took shape in the 1896 decision Talton v. Mayes.
2. The Tribal Relationship to the Federal Government
The Court laid the framework for understanding the dual sovereignty that
exists between tribal governments and the federal government in Talton v.
Mayes.16 The Court held that although the tribal sovereignty of the
Cherokee Nation is “restrained by the general provisions of the
Constitution” and “subject to the dominant authority of Congress,” the
Tribe’s authority did not arise out of the Constitution, as the Cherokee

10. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
13. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)).
14. Id. at 201.
15. CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM CASES AND MATERIAL 235, 256 (6th ed. 2010) (referencing Justice
Thomas’ concurrence in Lara, 541 U.S. at 214-26); see also United States v. Bryant, 136 S.
Ct. 1954, 1968-69 (2016), as revised (July 7, 2016).
16. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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Nation existed before the Constitution.17 Because the Cherokee Nation’s
sovereignty did not arise out of the Constitution, as the federal
government’s did, the Tribe is not bound by the Fifth Amendment.18
There is an important distinction, however, between the “general
provisions of the constitution” and other rights carried in the Constitution.19
Talton, and later Wheeler, affirm the position that constitutional rights that
act specifically as restraints on federal and state powers cannot operate on
tribal sovereigns.20 Examples of rights that operate on federal and state
powers but not on tribes include the absence of just compensation
requirements for tribes21 and a lack of First Amendment rights for tribal
members.22 However, the Constitution’s general provisions, those directed
at any actor, private or otherwise, such as the Civil Rights Act and
proscriptions against slavery, do apply to tribal sovereigns.23 For example,
the Ninth Circuit has heard claims against tribal leaders alleging racist acts
and remarks in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.24
3. Drawing the Line Between Sovereigns
The Court further explained the framework for defining the line between
tribal and federal powers in United States v. Wheeler.25 The Court was
asked to determine whether the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy
Clause precluded federal courts from trying a case against a tribal member
that included acts that had already been tried in a tribal court.26 The
question boiled down to whether the Navajo Tribe’s authority to try the
defendant in its own courts was part of the Tribe’s “inherent tribal
sovereignty, or an aspect of the sovereignty of the Federal Government
17. Id. at 384 (considering the Tribe’s use of a less than twelve-member grand jury
panel).
18. Id. at 382-83, 385.
19. Id. at 384.
20. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 235 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
21. Barona Grp. of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Am. Mgmt. &
Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding there is no just compensation
requirement for tribes).
22. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959)
(denying First Amendment rights to tribal members).
23. Id. at 235 (citing United States v. Choctaw Nation, 38 Ct. Cl. 558 (1903), aff’d, 193
U.S. 115 (1904); In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (D. Alaska 1886)).
24. Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989).
25. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
26. Id. at 315-16.
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which has been delegated to the tribes by Congress[.]”27 The Court
acknowledged that the tribal interests in self-governance were similar to
state interests in self-governance, and therefore federal preemption into
either area would be a substantial infraction.28 Finding no congressional act
or treaty that created the sovereignty of the Navajo Tribe, the Court held the
power to try native members in tribal courts was an inherent power.29 “The
powers of Indian tribes are, in general, ‘inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’”30 The Court outlined that
in order for tribal sovereignty to be restricted there must either be a treaty or
an act of Congress allowing such restriction.31
[The Indian tribes’] incorporation within the territory of the
United States, and their acceptance of its protection, necessarily
divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had
previously exercised. By specific treaty provision they yielded
up other sovereign powers; by statute, in the exercise of its
plenary control, Congress has removed still others.32
The prime examples of federal statutes that impose limits on tribal
sovereignty are the relevant sections of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934,33 and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.34
4. The Power to Extinguish Tribal Sovereignty
With cases such as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,35 and Duro v.
Reina,36 the Court moved from standing on explicit congressional acts to
relying on implicit inferences drawn from applicable federal statutes or
treaties.37 For example, in Oliphant, the Court found that a lack of an
explicit grant of tribal authority over non-natives equaled a lack of inherent

27. Id. at 322.
28. Id. at 332.
29. Id. at 328.
30. Id. at 322 (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (4th
prtg. 1945)).
31. Id. at 323.
32. Id. (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
33. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2012).
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
35. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
36. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
37. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 256-57, 273-74, 276.
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authority over non-tribal members.38 Similarly in Duro, the Court found
that there was an implicit divestiture of tribal power over non-members,
natives who are not members of the governing tribe, due to the dependent
status of tribes.39 Oliphant and Duro are examples of the Court seizing the
opportunity to determine the scope of tribal self-governance. The Court
strayed from the Wheeler analysis that relied on finding explicit grants from
Congress, and moved to an analysis that drew implicit inferences from
federal sources.40 The Court’s movement towards using implicit inferences
to override tribal sovereignty runs the risk of overextending congressional
plenary powers and may place the sovereignty-extinguishing power in the
hands of the Court.41 Oliphant and Duro also highlight the struggle that the
Court endures when trying to find the correct method of construction for
federal sources that acknowledges both inherent tribal sovereignty that
existed before the Constitution and the ability of the federal government to
extinguish tribal sovereignty.42 This struggle comes to light most
prominently when the Court interprets the ICRA.
B. Indian Civil Rights Act
The ICRA is an exercise of congressional plenary powers over tribal
sovereignty.43 The Act grants many of the rights afforded to persons
appearing in federal courts from the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment to persons appearing in tribal courts. However, the Court’s
application of the sovereignty-restricting statute is not a total incorporation
of the Bill of Rights.44 For example, when a tribal court’s criminal sentence
gives rise to a severe restraint on a tribal member’s personal liberty, that
member may petition federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus;45 access to
federal courts is guaranteed to tribal members by the ICRA.46 As the Court
has previously recognized, limitations on sovereignty can only come from
38. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212, superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-137, 105 Stat. 646, as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205 (2004)
(“Congress has the power to relax the restrictions imposed by the political branches on the
tribes’ inherent prosecutorial authority.”).
39. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
40. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 256-57, 273-74, 276.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 277 (showing Oliphant employed a historical methodology, while Duro ignored
the historical recognition of tribal authority over non-member natives).
43. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 327-28.
44. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 256.
45. Id. at 246 (citing Alire v. Johnson, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Ore. 1999)).
46. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/6

No. 1]

NOTE

243

Congress and not from the Supreme Court; application of the ICRA creates
a challenge for the Court to not overextend Congress’s plenary powers
when interpreting ICRA provisions.47
When interpreting the ICRA to answer the question of whether tribal
courts have the authority to try natives who are not members of the
governing tribe,48 the Court, in United States v. Lara, found that ICRA
provisions are not delegations of federal power, but are instead an outline of
the “bounds of the inherent tribal authority.”49 Subsequently, tribal actions
taken or challenged under the ICRA are not subject to the full gamut of
rights and restrictions conferred by the Constitution, but instead are to be
analyzed under the scope of federally recognized inherent tribal authority.50
When analyzing the ICRA provision at issue in Lara, the Court employed a
construction method of looking at the statute’s text and legislative history. 51
In Lara, the Court held that it is Congress who may wield the power to
either increase or relax restrictions on tribal authority. The ICRA provision
at issue in Lara is an example of Congress engaging in its constitutional
right to relax previously recognized tribal authority restrictions.52
While Talton, through inference, denied application of the Bill of Rights
in tribal courts, it still maintained the existence of congressional plenary
powers over tribes.53 In an exercise of the right to restrict tribal sovereignty,
Congress enacted the ICRA, expressly making applicable some, but not all,
Bill of Rights provisions on tribal governments.54 An example of one of the
specifically omitted provisions includes the right to free counsel.55 In
addition, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez interprets the extent of the
restrictions the ICRA actually imposes on tribes and outlines how the courts
should analyze congressional intent.56

47. Id. at 256 (citing Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 756-57 (1866) (“[C]onferring
rights and privileges on these Indians cannot affect their situation . . . .”)).
48. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196, 210 (2004) (comparing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
with Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)).
49. Id. at 207.
50. Id. at 207, 210.
51. Id. at 199.
52. Id. at 207, 210.
53. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 412 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 38384 (1896)).
54. Id. at 412 (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82
Stat. 77).
55. Id. at 413.
56. 436 U.S. 49, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66-72 (1978).
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When answering the question of tribal immunity from federal suits
brought under the ICRA, the Court, in Martinez, rejected arguments that the
ICRA created an implicit federal cause of action57. The Court called for
“tread[ing] lightly” on tribal sovereignty when judicially interpreting
congressional plenary powers.58 The Court found the sole express remedy
of habeas corpus, reserved only for questions on tribal imprisonment, to be
a deliberate congressional choice that the Court had no authority to expand
by allowing additional implicit inferences.59 The Court reasoned that the
ICRA was not an attempt to bring tribal governments under the full
restrictions of the Constitution, instead it “selectively incorporated and . . .
modified [some] of the . . . Bill of Rights [provisions] to fit the unique
political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.”60 The Court
found that imposing an implicitly created cause of action in the ICRA was
an overextension of congressional plenary powers; finding otherwise would
frustrate the congressional goal of protecting tribal sovereignty, would
result in a financial burden, and lacked of basis in the legislative history and
the discussions on the remedy issue.61
Martinez provides the proper construction analysis for interpreting the
ICRA. However, in Alvarez the Ninth Circuit relied on a balancing method
set out in Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court.62
C. The Randall Balancing Test
The Ninth Circuit used the Randall balancing test to determine to what
standard tribal court actions should be held during a habeas proceeding in
federal court.63 This concept, derived from Eighth Circuit opinions,64 is
intended to grant proper respect for tribal sovereignty while also granting

57. Id. at 64-66.
58. Id. at 60.
59. Id. at 61.
60. Id. at 62.
61. Id. at 58, 60, 62, 64, 66-72.
62. 841 F.2d 897, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1988).
63. Id.
64. White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973) (“The tribe
itself . . . has established voting procedures precisely paralleling those commonly found in
our culture . . . . Here, then, we have no problem of forcing an alien culture, with strange
procedures, on this tribe.”); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1973)
(adopting the One Feather equal protection voting holding and adding that “[w]hile the
Indian Civil Rights Act does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes by
specific language, we read the Act to do so by implication.”).
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federal constitutional rights to individuals.65 The Randall case primarily
focused on a question of due process, and the Ninth Circuit found that
because the due process provision language of the ICRA “substantially
track[ed]” the due process provision language of the Bill of Rights, federal
constitutional standards applied.66 The method of looking to substantially
tracked language is coupled with looking for tribal procedures that mirror
procedures of Anglo-Saxon courts.67 Though the Randall Court premised
its use of this construction method on the view that the substantially tracked
language should be treated “as a conduit to transmit federal constitutional
protections,” it hedged this statement with the Martinez statement that the
ICRA supplies individuals subject to tribal authority with “broad
constitutional rights” in order to prevent arbitrary and unjust tribal actions.68
For tribal questions that do not substantially track procedural language
and Anglo-Saxon court norms, the Ninth Circuit developed a weighing test
pieced together by the dual opinions of Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes
and Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs.69 Howlett provides the
Anglo-Saxon measure, and Stands Over Bull provides the weighing
standard: “the individual right to fair treatment under the law must be
weighed against the clearness of the particular guarantee afforded the
individual, taken together with the magnitude of the tribal interest as
applied to the particular facts.”70 Both Howlett and Stands Over Bull were
decided before the Supreme Court ruled on Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo,71 and lower courts in both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits declined
to apply principles from Howlett and Stands Over Bull in light of
Martinez.72 Because Randall is based upon outdated reasoning and, in
65. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir. 1976).
66. Randall, 841 F.2d at 899-900 (citing Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 364 (9th Cir.
1977)).
67. Id. at 900.
68. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978)).
69. Randall, 841 F.2d at 900 (dicta) (citing Howlett, 529 F.2d at 238; Stands Over Bull v.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp. 360, 375 (D. Mont. 1977)).
70. Stands Over Bull, 442 F. Supp. at 375 (citing Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540
F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 913 (1977), rev’d by 436 U.S. 49
(1978)).
71. 436 U.S. 49.
72. See MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D. Nev. 1993)
(abrogating Howlett by stating that strict scrutiny review of tribal decisions is not
appropriate after Martinez, and instead applying rational basis review); Ordinance Fifty Nine
Ass’n v. Babbitt, 970 F. Supp. 914, 926 (D. Wyo. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Ordinance Fifty
Nine Ass’n v. U.S. Dep't of Interior Sec'y, 163 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that to the
extent Howlett differs from Martinez, Howlett is no longer good law); Maldonado v. Yakima

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

246

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

operation, ignores the “tread lightly” demands of both Congress and Court
precedent, the Ninth Circuit should have relied on the construction method
set out in Martinez. Only upon a finding of arbitrary and unjust tribal action
should the Ninth Circuit have ruled against the Community tribal court. The
facts of the case coupled with the appropriate standard of review from
Martinez reveal that Alvarez’s jury rights were not violated.
III. Statement of the Case: Alvarez v. Lopez
A. Facts
In 2003, a twenty-year-old intoxicated Alvarez (an enrolled member of
the Community)73 went to his fifteen-year-old girlfriend’s house, struck her
with a flashlight, and threatened her with a knife.74 The altercation ended
after Alvarez also struck the girlfriend’s brother, and threatened to kill the
entire family.75 Alvarez was arrested by the Community police, charged
with assault and other related offenses, and was given a “Defendant’s
Rights” form.76 This form notified Alvarez that he had the right to a jury
trial, but did not specify that in order to invoke that right, he must request a
jury.77 At trial, Alvarez represented himself, did not present a defense, did
not ask questions, or indicate that he was interested in requesting a jury. 78
Alvarez was charged with assault, domestic violence, and misconduct
involving a weapon.79 It is an undisputed fact that Alvarez was not notified
that he had to request a jury trial.80
B. Procedural History
Alvarez sought relief from his tribal court conviction from the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona.81 The district court

Tribal Gaming Corp., No. CV-06-3065-FVS, 2008 WL 4459453, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Sept.
30, 2008) (dismissing due to Stands Over Bull no longer proving federal jurisdictional basis
in light of Martinez); Tenney v. Iowa Tribe, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (D. Kan. 2003)
(finding no jurisdictional basis from Stands Over Bull in light of Martinez).
73. Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. Aug. 2016).
74. Id. at 1026, 1031.
75. Id. at 1031.
76. Id. at 1026.
77. Id. at 1031.
78. Id. at 1026, 1031.
79. Id. at 1026.
80. Id. at 1035.
81. Id. at 1025-26.
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dismissed his federal habeas petition.82 The appellate panel affirmed the
district court’s decision in 2014, but after rehearing, withdrew the 2014
decision, and reversed and remanded the federal habeas petition back to the
district court.83
C. Majority Opinion
1. Issue Framing
“We consider whether an Indian tribe violated a criminal defendant’s
rights by failing to inform him that he could receive a jury trial only by
requesting one.”84 The majority ignored arguments set forth in the
pleadings, which debated whether or not jury rights included in the ICRA
mirrored the Sixth Amendment’s jury rights, and instead adopted the
Randall balancing test due to tribal court proceedings differing substantially
from federal court proceedings.85
2. Holding
Because the text of the ICRA jury provision states “upon request” and
because Alvarez’s interests in understanding his rights outweighs any
Community interest, the Community violated Alvarez’s right to jury trial by
failing to inform him of the need for an affirmative request in order to
invoke the right to jury trial.86 The notice requirement is mandatory, as the
text of the ICRA reads: “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment shall . . . deny to any person accused of an offense punishable
by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury . . . .”87
3. Reasoning
The majority reached its holding by analyzing the arguments under the
Randall balancing test.88 The Randall balancing test pits the individual’s
right to fair treatment against the tribe’s interest in order to evaluate a
procedure’s compliance with the ICRA standard.89 The majority conceded
82. Id. at 1031.
83. Id. at 1030.
84. Id. at 1026.
85. Id. at 1029.
86. Id. at 1029-30.
87. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) (2012) (emphasis added), quoted in Alvarez, 835 F.3d at
1028.
88. Alvarez, 835 F.3d at 1028-29 (citing Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841
F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988)).
89. Id.
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that the Randall test has never before been applied to section 202(10) of the
ICRA, but maintained that the Randall test “sweep[s] beyond” the sections
to which it was previously applied.90
The majority concluded that Alvarez was not granted the right to fair
treatment when he was given a form that told him he had a right to a jury
trial, as opposed to what he actually had, which was the right to request a
jury trial.91 The majority supported its position by pointing out that other
rights listed on the form did not have to be affirmatively requested.92 The
majority went so far as to state that the “Defendant’s Rights” form is
misleading.93 The majority also emphasized Alvarez’s age (“barely out of
his teens”), seventh grade education, and his lack of defense counsel during
his arrest and trial by the Community.94 The majority concluded that
Alvarez’s right to be informed of the condition attached to his right to a jury
far outweighed any intrusion into the tribe’s interest “in using a boilerplate
form that gives defendants a misleading picture of their rights.”95
D. Kozinski Concurrence
Circuit Judge Kozinski launched a scathing criticism of the Gila River
Indian Community’s criminal justice system in a short concurrence, finding
“a rat’s nest of problems with the Community’s justice system.”96 Kozinski
mourned the fact that Alvarez would receive little justice from the court’s
ruling since he had already been released from his prison sentence.97
However, Kozinski hoped the Community would take this opportunity to
rectify the list of judicial shortcomings he set out in the concurrence. 98
Kozinski suggested that the Community “reflect on whether it is proud to
have” committed such errors.99

90. Id. at 1029 n.5 (explaining that the Randall test was developed to analyze section
202(8) of the ICRA but extends beyond section 202(8)).
91. Id. at 1029.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1030.
96. Id. at 1030 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 1031.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1030.
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E. O’Scannlain Dissent
1. Issue Framing
Did the Community breach Alvarez’s “right, upon request, to a trial by
jury” under the scope of the ICRA when Alvarez never requested a jury? 100
The dissent called into question the majority’s use of the “unmoored”
Randall balancing test and argued that the question before the court should
be analyzed under the standards of the ICRA alone.
2. Holding
Because Alvarez did not request a jury trial, the Community did not
violate his right to receive a jury trial upon request. The ICRA text demands
that a jury trial be granted upon request; it does not demand that the
defendant be notified of the need to request the right in order to invoke that
right.
3. Reasoning
The dissent began by reminding the court of the basic concepts of civil
rights in a tribal court context: tribal civil rights are guaranteed based on the
“‘tribal bill of rights . . . and federal statues” such as the ICRA; however,
tribal civil rights are not the same as the federal Bill of Rights.101 The
dissent then explained that due to (1) the inapplicability of the Randall test,
(2) the ICRA text, (3) the context of section 202(10)of the ICRA, and (4)
the need to balance congressional plenary powers against tribal sovereignty,
the Community did not violate Alvarez’s jury rights under the standards of
section 202(10) because he did not request a jury.102
a) Inapplicability of the Randall Balancing Test
The dissent accused the majority of injecting a due process claim in
order to employ the Randall test, which has only ever been employed in
analyzing the ICRA’s due process standard and not in the ICRA’s jury right
standards.103 The dissent critiques the majority’s lack of reasoning for
applying the Randall test, contending the majority’s belief that “the
100. Id. at 1034 (O’Scannlain ,J., dissenting) (quoting Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-824, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
1302(a)(6)-(8),(10) (2012)).
101. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain ,J., dissenting) (quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW § 14.03[1], at 944 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN]).
102. Id. at 1031-37 (O’Scannlain ,J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1032 (citing id. at 1029 n.5).
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language and principle of Randall sweep beyond Section 202(8)” is
insufficient and that the “absence of reasons” is not how the court should
decide what standard to apply to a dispute.104 The Randall test is even more
inappropriate because Alvarez did not raise it as an argument, therefore, the
Community cannot have been expected to argue against it.105 Lastly, the
dissent argued that a test designed to analyze general due process rights has
no place in the analysis of a right that is explicitly accounted for in the
ICRA text.106 The dissent supported its position by citing Tom v. Sutton,
which determined that the due process provision in section 202(8) of the
ICRA was not to be applied to a question of indigent defense rights when a
more specific provision, section 202(6), addressing the right to counsel,
existed in the statute.107 Having argued the inapplicability of the Randall
test, the dissent set forth the appropriate method for deciding the case:
construe the ICRA provision in an analysis of Alvarez’s argument that the
ICRA provision should be applied in the same way as the federal Bill of
Right’s Sixth Amendment.108
b) Textual Construction of the ICRA
Alvarez’s argument that the federal standard for the right to a jury trial
should apply is flawed because the federal Bill of Rights is not imposed on
tribes.109 Instead, the Bill of Rights was used, via selective incorporation or
modification, as a model for tribal rights.110 This is evidenced by the key
distinctions between many provisions in the ICRA and the Bill of Rights.111
Just as section 202(6) of the ICRA, the right to counsel at the expense of the
defendant, does not exactly mirror the Sixth Amendment, which grants the
right to free counsel, section 202(10) does not exactly mirror the Sixth

104. Id.
105. Id. at 1032-33.
106. Id. at 1033 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998);
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770
F.3d 772, 805 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)).
107. Id. at 1033 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Tom).
108. Id. at 1034 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (contrasting the majority’s quick dismissal
of Alvarez’s argument, and taking this argument as a relevant question that should be
determined).
109. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct.
1954, 1962 (2016)).
110. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 62 (1978)).
111. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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Amendment.112 “Subsection 202(10) expressly required a request to receive
a jury, it did not require an impartial jury, and it did not require a jury ‘of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.’”113 The
Sixth Amendment makes a jury trial a default in criminal cases, where the
ICRA provision only grants jury rights when requested.114
While the Sixth Amendment and section 202(10) are similar, they are
intentionally different.115 The plain text of section 202(10) demands a
requested jury be granted, but does not require notification.116 The lack of
such a notification requirement “strongly suggests” Congress’s intent to not
require notification.117
c) Context of ICRA Section 202(10)
“Context reinforces that the right to receive a jury trial does not include a
right to be notified of the need to request a jury trial.”118 While section
202(10) does not contain an explicit notice mandate, its neighboring
provision, section 301, does.119 Section 301 mandates that the Court of
Indian Affairs grant the same rights to defendants as if they were appearing
in federal court, and it also contains explicit text requiring notice of said
rights.120 However, 301 pertains only to the Court of Indian Affairs, a court
established by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for tribes who could not
establish their own criminal courts.121 The lack of an explicit notice
mandate in section 201(10), in the context of section 301, is strongly
suggestive that Congress did not intend to impose a notice requirement on

112. Id.
113. Id. at 1034 (comparing section 202(10) of the ICRA with the Sixth Amendment).
114. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“ICRA . . . [‘]selectively incorporated and
in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political,
cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.’”) (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62).
116. Id. at 1035 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1035-36 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90–284, § 301, 82 Stat. 73, 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012))).
120. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 301, 82
Stat. at 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1311) (“Thus, in federally established Courts of Indian
Offenses, a model code would assure that defendants there both have rights—the full slate of
rights provided by our Constitution—and that they have notice of these rights.”).
121. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 301, 82
Stat. at 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1311); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64
n.12 (1978); COHEN, supra note 101, § 4.04[3][c], at 263-64).
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criminal courts established by tribes, such as the Community’s criminal
court.122
d) Substantive Canons of Federal Indian Law
The dissent calls for the court to “tread lightly” when interpreting federal
statutes that affect tribal sovereignty.123 The dissent acknowledges that
Congress has plenary authority over tribal officers with respect to habeas
corpus relief,124 but cautions that that authority be carefully balanced with
respect for tribal sovereignty.125 The dissent emphasizes that precedent
demands a careful balance “in the absence of clear indications of legislative
intent.”126
IV. Analysis and Discussion
The dissent is correct in every facet of its analysis and the following
section adds an analysis of precedent that supports the dissent’s conclusion.
Federal precedent has set a clear directive for decades: “[A]void undue
or intrusive interference in reviewing Tribal Court procedures.”127 Where
the majority gives only a passing nod to this clearly established directive,
the dissent rests its reasoning squarely on this principle. The matter at issue
in Alvarez was procedural. The Community’s procedural choice to employ
a “Defendant’s Rights” form that did not specify the need to request a jury
in order to receive a jury was squarely within the tribe’s procedural
authority and should not be infringed upon by federal courts. Comity to
tribal procedural decisions is demanded by the precedent set by the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs
Reservation of Oregon,128 and the majority gives no reason why it should be
abandoned.

122. Id. at 1036 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60, quoting in turn
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60, quoting in turn McClanahan v. Ariz. State
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)).
127. Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation, 783 F.2d 1409, 1412
(9th Cir. 1986) (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 67).
128. Id. (“Comity towards the Tribal Courts requires that deference be given to the
procedures which those courts choose to follow.”).
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The Randall test improperly assumed a greater plenary power than
Congress intended because the test, in operation, imposes federal
constitutional standards upon tribal court actions. As has been clearly
described by decades of precedent, inherent tribal powers that are not
delegated by Congress are not subject to federal constitutional standards.129
Lara informs the courts that the ICRA is not a delegation of federal powers
to the tribes subject to federal standards,130 and instead that the appropriate
construction method is to stay within the text and the legislative history of
the statue.131 The Alvarez dissent abides by the narrow construction
standard set forth in Lara with its argument that the text of the provision at
issue clearly lacks an informing mandate.132 The text of the ICRA provision
at issue does not explicitly contain a mandate to inform. Instead, it
commands that tribal sovereigns do not deny “the right, upon request, to a
trial by jury.”133 The context of the ICRA provision also demonstrates that
when Congress requires a mandate to inform, it uses explicit language, such
as in section 301, applicable only to Courts of Indian Affairs and not tribal
courts such as the Community tribal court, which mandates certain rights
and distinctly mandates notice of said rights.134 Section 202 has no such
notice mandate. Therefore, to draw a rule out of congressional silence is
anathema to the mandate of precedent and the goals of the ICRA to secure
and promote tribal sovereignty.135
The reasoning behind the Randall test rests too much on implications
drawn from silences,136 and congressional plenary powers are overextended
when interpreted by the courts from anything but explicit statutory text.137
Martinez warned against drawing implicit rules from silence when the
Court said “[w]here Congress seeks to promote dual objectives in a single
statute, courts must be more than usually hesitant to infer from its silence a
cause of action that, while serving one legislative purpose, will disserve the
other.”138 The Martinez Court based its reasoning on “[t]he canon of
construction applied over a century and a half by this Court . . . that the
129. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). See generally United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
130. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196, 210.
131. Id. at 199.
132. See supra Part III.E.3.b.
133. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) (2012) (emphasis added).
134. See supra Part III.E.3.c.
135. See supra Part III.E.
136. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978); see supra Part III.E.3.b.
137. See supra Part III.E.3.b.
138. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).
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wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the Indians is not
to be construed to their prejudice.”139 The Randall test finds its roots in an
Eighth Circuit opinion that contains troubling phrases such as this: “While
the Indian Civil Rights Act does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of
Indian tribes by specific language, we read the Act to do so by
implication.”140 This line of reasoning runs completely contrary to the
canon of respecting tribal sovereignty by searching only for explicit
directives reinforced by Lara and Martinez. The application of the Randall
balancing test is wrong due to the test’s precedential basis being supplanted
by Martinez. The Randall test rests on cases decided before Martinez and
their reasoning is no longer useful due to the clarity shed by Martinez.
Although the majority claims to be applying a balancing test in lieu of
applying federal standards, due to the difference in tribal and federal court
proceedings, the majority’s numerous criticisms of the Community tribal
court’s lack of federal conformity suggests otherwise.141 Judge Kozinski
reprimanded the Community’s criminal court for several alleged
shortcomings not at issue in Alvarez, such as a lack of appointed indigent
defense counsel.142 The recently upheld inapplicability of the Sixth
Amendment to tribal courts in United States v. Bryant is a shining example
of a constitutional right that is guaranteed in federal courts but not in tribal
courts.143 To reprimand the Community for employing a method of criminal
justice that has been held to be completely within its right is acrimonious
toward the federal and tribal delineation of sovereignty. Respecting tribal
sovereignty means respecting differences between tribal cultural and
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. It is important for the federal government to
remember, as the Court remembered in Bryant and the Alvarez court forgot,
that tribal jurisprudence focuses more on community-oriented goals as
opposed to the federal norm of fixating on the rights of the individual. What
the Bryant Court understood is that, in cases where the tribal procedure
most directly conflicts with federal procedural norms, it is imperative to
temper any intrinsic beliefs and apply a deferential standard toward tribal

139. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) (emphasis added) (citing Choate
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (holding that construction should be liberal, not strict,
and resolved in favor of the tribes who are the wards of the federal government)).
140. Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973).
141. Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
142. Id.
143. 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1958 (2016), as revised (July 7, 2016).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/6

No. 1]

NOTE

255

actions in order to achieve the congressional goal of protecting tribal
sovereignty.
The balancing of tribal sovereignty against the individual’s rights is an
Anglo-Saxon construction that does not comport with the tribal culture of
community-oriented policies. While the U.S. Bill of Rights seeks to elevate
individual freedoms above state intrusion, many tribal cultures show a
desire to protect community harmony by imposing responsibilities on
individuals.144 Because of these differences, even similarly worded
provisions between the Bill of Rights and the ICRA can be interpreted very
differently between tribal and federal courts.145 As seen in Winnebago Tribe
of Nebraska v. Bigfire, retaining tribal culture and identity was the
paramount tradeoff in the decision of many tribes to accept leaving their
ancestral homelands for reservations.146 The decision in Winnebago to not
apply the federal equal protection standard to tribal governments in favor of
tribal traditions and governing norms is an example of the restraint federal
courts should apply when reviewing tribal cases. Martinez also discussed
another example of the restraint required, citing Native American Church of
North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, where it was held that the First
Amendment’s religious freedom guarantees did not apply to tribal
governments.147 Respect for tribal culture is at the root of all policies
regarding respect for tribal sovereignty.148
In addition to respecting tribal culture, there is also no need to apply an
outdated and inappropriate balancing test because Martinez provides the
appropriate test to apply when reviewing tribal court actions in federal
court. Martinez commands that the ICRA provides “broad constitutional
rights” in order to prevent arbitrary and unjust tribal actions.149 This broad
grant of constitutional rights should be interpreted as a general grant, not a
specific grant, of each Bill of Rights provision coupled with federal
standards of constitutional review. The ICRA did not impose a total
144. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 408 (citing Angela R. Riley, (Tribal)
Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799 (2007); Bruce G. Miller, The Individual,
the Collective, and Tribal Code, AM. IND. CULTURE & RESEARCH J., vol. 21, no. 1, at 107
(1997)).
145. Id.
146. 25 Ind. L. Rep. 6229 (Winn. Sup. Ct. 1998), reprinted in GOLDBERG, supra note 15,
at 408-11.
147. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 80 n.5 (1978) (citing Native Am.
Church of N. Am., 272 F.2d 131, 132, 135 (10th Cir. 1959)).
148. See id. at 62; Bigfire, 25 Ind. L. Rep. 6229, reprinted in GOLDBERG, supra note 15,
at 409.
149. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 61.
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incorporation of the Bill of Rights onto tribal courts. Instead, a commitment
to tribal sovereignty led Congress to selectively incorporate the principles
found in the Bill of Rights in order to make allowances for the customs and
needs of the tribes. The test created in Martinez leans heavily towards tribal
deference. As the District Court of Nevada noted, after Martinez, strict
scrutiny is inappropriate and rational basis is the correct test to ensure
deference to tribal sovereignty.150 The appropriate review of tribal actions is
to ask whether the action was arbitrary and unjust.151 Based on the
congressional goal of respecting tribal sovereignty this must be interpreted
as a high bar against tribal incursions.152 The Martinez test sets a high bar
for showing restraint when interpreting congressional plenary powers, and
the limitation on tribal sovereignty incursions is exactly in line with the
“tread lightly” approach called for by Martinez and over a century of
judicial precedent.153
The “Defendant’s Rights” form’s lack of the phrase “upon request”
hardly rises to the level of “unjust” Martinez requires before federal
incursion is appropriate. Alvarez, as the dissent points out, had ample
opportunity to ask questions throughout the process and during his defense
of himself. Alvarez should have at least noticed that there was not a jury
present, and thereby he could have indicated a desire to have a jury at that
time. He did not request a jury, and nothing in the record shows he
indicated to the court that he wanted one during his trial process. Therefore,
Alvarez’s rights to a jury trial were not violated, because the court did not
deny a request for a jury.

150. MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D. Nev. 1993).
151. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 61.
152. See id. at 66-67 (“[ICRA accommodates] goals of ‘preventing injustices perpetrated
by tribal governments, on the one hand, and, on the other, avoiding undue or precipitous
interference in the affairs of the Indian people.’” (quoting SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN:
SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT TO S. RES. 194, 89TH
CONG., 2D SESS., at 12 (Comm. Print 1966)); Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs
Reservation, 783 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1986) (employing the Martinez mandate of
avoiding undue intrusions into tribal sovereignty when interpreting ICRA).
153. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60; Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975); Choate
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675, (1912); see also Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.
2016) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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V. Conclusion
The majority erred in its decision to read into the ICRA text a mandate
for notice of the need to request a jury in order to invoke the right. As the
dissent argues, to do so is a misinterpretation of the text and context of the
ICRA and an overextension of congressional plenary powers.
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